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Predicting Parole Grants: An Analysis of Suitability
Hearings for California’s Lifer Inmates
I. Introduction
In the past few years, the United States has moved toward
an unprecedented bipartisan consensus that we have
a mass incarceration problem: too many people serving
too-long sentences. An increasing number and proportion
of these inmates are serving life terms. From 2008 to 2012,
the national ‘lifer’ population rose 11.8 percent, from
142,727 to 159,520.1 California houses the greatest propor-
tion of these inmates (30.1 percent of its prison population),
followed by Utah (29.2 percent) and Nevada (21.5 percent).2
The large majority of lifer inmates nationally (110,439
out of 159,520, or nearly 70 percent) were sentenced to
indeterminate terms, and are serving life terms with the
possibility of parole. California accounts for roughly one
third of this number, with 35,759 lifer inmates. No other
state rivals California on this score. Texas, in second place,
has only 8,493 inmates serving life terms with the possi-
bility of parole.3 In most states, a parole board or similar
governing body determines lifer inmates’ chances of
release by deciding whether, when, and under what con-
ditions a lifer inmate will be permitted to leave prison.
Despite the large number of lifer inmates, strikingly
little is known about states’ decision-making process for
releasing them,4 and releasing authorities’ suitability
determinations are largely invisible to the public eye. This
study is an important step forward in understanding the
factors that predict parole release. We report the initial
results from an analysis of over 700 California lifer hear-
ings. Controlling for a variety of factors, including char-
acteristics of the inmate, the crime, and the hearing itself,
we identify several variables that are significantly associ-
ated with a lifer inmate’s chance of receiving a parole
grant.
II. The California Lifer Landscape
California first instituted parole as a means of early release
for prisoners serving ‘‘excessive’’ terms, and parole has
been viewed increasingly as a means of managing the state
prison population.5 Overpopulation has gained particular
import since Brown v. Plata in 2011, when the U.S.
Supreme Court held that the state’s crowded prisons vio-
lated the Eighth Amendment.6 Efforts to reduce the overall
prison population, most notably Public Safety Realignment
(AB 109), have resulted in a state prison system more and
more concentrated with serious offenders.
As of September 2015, 34,466 individuals were serving
life sentences with the possibility of parole in California,7
including many inmates serving three-strike sentences.
This number represents more than one in four of the state’s
inmates, and has increased by seven percent just in the past
half-decade (and this does not include prisoners serving life
terms without the possibility of parole).8 In short, the
number is enormous, representing not only a significant
percentage of California prisoners, but a substantial portion
of the nation’s lifers. The lifer population also differs in
composition from the rest of the state’s prison population;
it is older, more violent, and slightly more male, though its
racial makeup, resembles the general prison population in
California.9
III. The Parole Process in California
A. Conduct of the Hearing
One Commissioner and one Deputy Commissioner10 pre-
side over every lifer parole hearing in California.11 Both are
Board of Parole Hearings (BPH) employees, but they serve
distinct roles. Commissioners, of whom the state usually
employs only twelve at any given time, are appointed by the
Governor and undergo a lengthy confirmation process. Lifer
hearings comprise nearly all of a Commissioner’s working
hours. Deputy Commissioners, on the other hand, are hired
through the civil service appointment process and currently
number around thirty-five. In addition to lifer hearings,
Deputy Commissioners conduct placement, mentally disor-
dered offender, and rehospitalization hearings, review BPH
decisions, and adjudicate pre-hearing decisions.12
Before each hearing, the prison where an inmate is
housed distributes a board packet to the Commissioner and
Deputy Commissioner assigned to a hearing, as well as to
the inmate’s attorney and the District Attorney’s office in
the county where the life crime was committed. The packet
contains key documents from the inmate’s central file
(C-file), including a summary of the life crime, the inmate’s
criminal record, psychological evaluations, the post-
conviction progress report, and prior parole decisions.
Commissioners and inmates’ attorneys are not required to
review the entire C-file before the hearing, though many do
so in addition to reading the board packet.
A lifer inmate’s initial suitability hearing takes place one
year before his or her minimum eligible release date. Each
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hearing is held in a small meeting room at the prison where
an inmate is housed. Typically, anywhere from four to eight
people are present around a conference table: the Com-
missioner, Deputy Commissioner, inmate and inmate’s
counsel, as well as members of other groups who are enti-
tled to be present, including the victim and/or victims’ next
of kin,13 a representative from the District Attorney’s office
in the county of conviction,14 and occasionally members of
the media.
The Commissioner is primarily responsible for running
the hearing and ensuring that all relevant topics are cov-
ered, including the commitment offense, the inmate’s
behavior and program participation in prison, and the
inmate’s plans for release. Although an inmate is not
required to discuss the life crime, the commissioners may,
and often do, question him or her about it. Ideally, these
questions are designed to probe the reasons the crime was
committed, since the degree to which the inmate has
addressed these factors—the so-called ‘‘nexus’’ between the
life crime and the danger the inmate currently poses—is
the crux of the determination.15 The Deputy Commissioner
typically conducts the portion of the hearing spent on post-
conviction factors, including disciplinary infractions and
program participation in prison. In most hearings, the
commissioners also spend a significant amount of time on
an inmate’s post-release plans (also known as exit plans or
parole plans), such as housing, employment, and substance
abuse relapse prevention. Victims and victims’ next of kin
are permitted to make a statement, and a representative
from the District Attorney’s office may speak as well. At the
commissioners’ discretion, letters from community mem-
bers supporting or opposing release may be read into the
record.16 Every inmate is represented by either publicly
appointed or private counsel. The inmate’s attorney typi-
cally gives a short statement or summation at the end. Most
hearings last between one and three hours, and all hearings
are audio recorded.
Immediately following a hearing’s conclusion, the room
is cleared of all persons except the Commissioner and
Deputy Commissioner. The two of them deliberate in
secret, usually for twenty to thirty minutes, then the parties
all reconvene and the commissioners announce their
decision. There is no record of these private deliberations.
B. Decision Criteria
Commissioners are tasked with determining whether an
inmate ‘‘will pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society
if released from prison.’’17 They are specifically directed to
consider a list of fifteen factors catalogued in the California
Code of Regulations (CCR).18 Circumstances that tend to
show unsuitability for release include an especially egre-
gious commitment offense (e.g., abuse or mutilation of the
victim; multiple victims), a previous record of violence or
sadistic sexual offenses, an unstable social history, psy-
chological problems, the presence or absence of exit plans,
and institutional misbehavior. The remaining nine cir-
cumstances tend to show suitability, and include the
absence of a juvenile record, evidence of remorse, and
a stable social history.
Although the CCR enumerates specific factors for
commissioners to consider in making suitability determi-
nations, it also underscores the commissioners’ wide lati-
tude. Commissioners may use any information they find
relevant, and ‘‘the importance attached to any circumstance
or combination of circumstances in a particular case is left
to the judgment of the panel.’’19 This is particularly so given
that many of the criteria are somewhat subjective. For
example, reasonable persons might disagree about whether
a crime was ‘‘exceptionally callous,’’ whether an inmate’s
motive for an offense was ‘‘inexplicable,’’ what kinds of
in-prison misconduct count as ‘‘serious,’’ or whether an
inmate’s relationships with others were ‘‘reasonably sta-
ble.’’ Making these kinds of judgment calls about the
meaning of a particular inmate’s circumstances is a funda-
mental part of each commissioner’s role.
If the panel votes to find the inmate suitable for parole
release (i.e., ‘‘grant parole’’), the grant is automatically sent
to the Governor for review. In the majority of cases, where
the life crime was murder, the Governor may affirm,
modify, or reverse the Board’s decision. In non-murder
cases, the Governor may remand the case back to the BPH
for a full Board review.20 In 2015, approximately 86.5 per-
cent of grants sent to the Governor were upheld, which is
a significant contrast to previous administrations. For
instance, Governor Grey Davis upheld 2.8 percent of parole
grants, and Governor Schwarzenegger upheld 28.8 percent
of parole grants (Figure 1).21
In the event that parole is denied, the panel must decide
on the proper ‘‘denial length’’—the amount of time that will
elapse before the inmate’s next hearing. Prior to 2008, the
panel could impose a denial length of one to five years, in
one-year increments. To set the term, they began with one
year as the default, adding additional years only if it was
‘‘not reasonable to expect that parole would be granted at
a hearing during the following year[s].’’22 This scheme was
drastically altered in November 2008 with the passage of
Proposition 9, Marsy’s Law. Thereafter, any panel that
denied parole was required to set the denial length begin-
ning with a default of fifteen years. A shorter denial length
could be imposed only with clear and convincing evidence
that safety considerations did not require longer incarcer-
ation. If commissioners found that such evidence existed,
they could then reduce a denial length to ten, seven, five, or
three years.23
IV. Trends in Lifer Parole
A. Grant Rates
California’s grant rate—the rate at which the BPH finds
lifer inmates suitable for release—remained below 8 per-
cent until 2008, when the California Supreme Court
handed down two key decisions, In re Lawrence24 and In re
Shaputis.25 These cases held that an inmate could not be
denied parole release based solely on the heinousness of the
crime he or she committed. Instead, the relevant inquiry is
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the ‘‘current dangerousness’’ the inmate poses; the com-
mitment offense is only useful insofar as it bears on this
threat to society. The need for a relationship between the
commitment offense and an inmate’s current dangerous-
ness has come to be known as the ‘‘nexus’’ requirement.
In the past seven years, likely due in no small part to
Lawrence and Shaputis, as well as to extensive professional
development training the BPH has undergone under the
appointment of Jennifer Shaffer as Executive Officer in 2011,
the grant rate for lifer inmates has more than tripled—from
8 percent in 2008 to 30 percent in 2015 (Figure 2).
As noted above, California is one of only a handful of
states in which the governor has the authority to reverse
parole board decisions.26 This authority was granted via
popular ballot measure in 1988, and applies to all murder
cases,27 which comprise the bulk of lifer commitment
offenses.28
As Figure 1 shows, from 1999 to 2011, even in the few
cases where the BPH found an inmate suitable for parole
release, Governors Grey Davis and Arnold Schwarzenegger
usually reversed grants. More recently, however, the elec-
tion of Governor Jerry Brown and administrative changes to
the BPH have resulted in a significant upward trend in the
lifer grant rate.29 The average reversal rate for lifer parole
grants has fallen to 13.5 percent. The increased grant rate by
the BPH, coupled with the significant reduction in reversals
by the Governor, has led to a record number of lifer inmates
being released from California prisons in the last several
years. Previous research suggests that their likelihood of
recidivating is extremely low.30
B. Factors Associated with Parole Release
Previous research on parole grants in California has sug-
gested that a number of factors, including some that are
unassociated with the BPH’s formal decision-making cri-
teria, may be related to an inmate’s chance of getting parole.
One assessment that reviewed past studies concluded that
‘‘parole boards do not consistently apply suitability criteria,
and that parole suitability decisions are ‘primarily a func-
tion of institutional behavior [and] crime severity,’ among
other factors.’’31 The same study found that gender, but not
race, appeared to affect the denial length that California
inmates received.32 This lack of a racial effect in parole
board releases is consistent with recent studies in other
jurisdictions.33
Multiple studies have suggested that the attendance of
victims and victims’ next of kin at parole hearings is asso-
ciated with a greater likelihood of parole denial.34 This
factor is particularly salient in California, where in 2008,
Marsy’s Law expanded the definition of ‘‘victim’’ and
affirmed victims’ rights to attend and speak at parole
hearings (among many other reforms).35 A study by the
Stanford Criminal Justice Center in 2011 found a signifi-
cant difference in the grant rate between hearings when
victims were and were not present: ‘‘When victims attend
hearings, the grant rate is less than half the rate when
Figure 1
Governor’s Reversal Rate for Parole Decisions
Involving Murder Cases, 1991–2015
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victims do not attend.’’36 The same study found that other
factors in the BPH’s assessment criteria—including the
inmate’s age, prior adult and juvenile record, and the
number of people victimized in the life crime—were not
significant. The authors stressed, however, that their anal-
yses were preliminary and correlational, writing that a more
nuanced analysis was necessary to control relevant factors
and tease out the relationship between variables. The
results we report here are the first step toward this more
nuanced analysis.
V. Methods
A. Data Collection
We received 754 hearing transcripts constituting a ran-
dom sample of 10 percent of all BPH suitability hearings
conducted between October 1, 2007, and January 28,
2010, from the California Department of Corrections
and Rehabilitation.37 The transcripts are a verbatim
record of the parole hearings, and averaged 150 pages in
length.
Five trained research assistants read and evaluated the
transcripts according to a detailed coding manual. Not only
did coders work under close supervision, but at the begin-
ning of the project, all were assigned to a series of identical
transcripts to ensure intercoder reliability. Coders recorded
152 separate variables for each transcript and recorded their
codes using a shared database, which took between forty-
five and sixty minutes per transcript per coder. The
variables covered twelve subject areas: basic information
about the hearing itself, background, discussion of crime,
prisoner’s prior history, progress in prison, exit plans,
psychological report, District Attorney’s statement,
inmate’s testimony, victim testimony, program participa-
tion, and reasons for the Board’s decision.
B. Data Analysis
We conducted a logistic regression analysis to examine the
effects of more than twenty variables of interest on grant or
denial of parole by the BPH. It is important to note that our
dependent variable in the analysis was dichotomous: we
looked at whether the Board voted to grant an inmate
parole, but made no distinction between longer and shorter
denial lengths.
We chose our independent variables based on multiple
criteria. Most importantly, we sought to include as many
variables as possible that represented factors the Board is
statutorily directed in the CCR to consider in making its
release decisions. These factors included the inmate’s age,
psychiatric evaluations, participation in rehabilitative
prison programs, and in-prison behavior. Additionally, we
included variables the earlier analysis of a subset of this
data had suggested might be relevant: the victim’s atten-
dance at the hearing, the District Attorney’s recommenda-
tion, and whether a hearing was an inmate’s first.38 We also
included a handful of other variables of interest that related
to characteristics about the inmate or the commitment
Figure 2
Board of Parole Hearings Grant Rate, 1978–2015
2008: Passage of Marsy's Law;
Lawrence and Shapus decisions
*There was only one lifer suitability hearing conducted in 1978 and in 1979, and two hearings in 1980.
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offense, such as race, gender, number of victims in the life
crime, and sexual violence in the life crime.
Finally, we used a stochastic data imputation strategy for
variables that had missing data. To ensure that the impu-
tation did not skew our results, we performed 1,000
imputations, ran a logistic regression independently for
each imputation, and pooled the results of these models.
Thus, the results we report here are likely a conservative
estimate of our independent variables’ significance.
VI. Results and Discussion
Our logistic regression model compares inmates who were
found suitable for parole release to inmates who were
denied parole, regardless of the denial term imposed.
Multiple groups of variables had significant or marginally
significant effects on an inmate’s chances of receiving
a parole grant. As we will discuss in more depth, many of
these variables are consistent with the Board’s formal cri-
teria. Results of our regression are shown in Figure 3, and
we address each variable, or group of variables, below,
including those that had no significant effect on an
inmate’s odds of release.39
A. Demographic Variables: Age, Race, and Gender
Age is positively correlated with an inmate’s chances of
obtaining a parole grant; older inmates were significantly
more likely to be found suitable for parole release, com-
pared to younger inmates. An increase of ten years in age
made an inmate anywhere from 1.3 to 5 times more likely to
be granted parole. This finding is consistent not only with
the large body of research documenting that older inmates
are less likely to recidivate, but also with the formal inclu-
sion of increased age as a factor that tends to indicate an
inmate’s suitability for release.
An inmate’s age at the commission of a crime, however,
had an inverse effect; the older an inmate was when he or
she committed the crime, the less likely he or she was to be
granted parole. Being ten years older made an inmate more
than half as likely to be granted parole. This result might
indicate that younger offenders are perceived as having
a greater capacity for rehabilitation. Releasing authorities
may also believe that younger offenders were more
impressionable or vulnerable to negative influences when
they committed their crimes, and are thus less ‘‘responsi-
ble’’ for their actions than older offenders are.
Consistent with previous studies, we found no signifi-
cant effects of an inmate’s race on his or her chances of
obtaining a parole grant versus a parole denial. We also
found no evidence that an inmate’s gender significantly
affects his or her chances of being granted parole.
B. Behavior in Prison
We included variables that represent both positive and
negative behavior in prison. Given the wide variety of
programs that any given prison may offer, as well as the
drastic differences in offerings between facilities, we cre-
ated a variable that indicated simply whether or not an
inmate had participated in some kind of programming.
This might include anger management, educational pro-
grammings, vocational training, and the like. The only
category of programming we considered as a separate
variable was substance abuse programming—that is,
programming related to drug or alcohol use, such as
Alcoholics Anonymous or Narcotics Anonymous. We
considered substance abuse separately for a couple of
reasons. First, it is one of the most common kinds of
programming available, and exists in many (if not most)
California prisons. This meant that there were enough
people who had participated in it for us to meaningfully
compare this group to people who had not. But more
importantly, in our data it acted as a kind of proxy for prior
drug or alcohol use—so much so, in fact, that covariance
prevented us from including prior drug or alcohol use in
our model. In order not to group everyone with a history of
drug and alcohol abuse into the ‘‘programming’’ variable,
it made sense to separate out substance abuse
programming.
We found that substance abuse programming partici-
pation was significantly and positively associated with
release; inmates who participated in substance abuse pro-
gramming were more likely to obtain parole grants than
inmates who had not participated. Because of the covari-
ance problem we mentioned above, it is a bit difficult to
interpret this result. It is entirely possible that commis-
sioners simply find this type of programming particularly
valuable. It is also possible, though, that the group who
participated in this programming were inmates whose
commitment offense was carried out while the inmate was
abusing drugs or alcohol, which we might imagine com-
missioners would consider an ‘‘external’’ cause of criminal
behavior—more of a disease or circumstance than a char-
acter flaw. This might make inmates who participated in
substance abuse programs seem more rehabilitable than
other inmates, provided their addiction was treated. Sur-
prisingly, participation in other types of programs, which
included educational and vocational programming, was not
significantly correlated with obtaining a grant.
Negative behaviors in prison can be measured in
a number of ways. Prisoners may receive a 128 rules vio-
lation report for committing a minor disciplinary infraction
or a 115 rules violation report for committing a major dis-
ciplinary infraction. Of course, these classifications are
somewhat subjective, and correctional officials have a great
deal of discretion in labeling prisoner misconduct. We
include two variables as proxies for prisoner misconduct.
First, we looked at the number of 115s an inmate had ever
received while incarcerated for his or her life crime, as
a way to examine the magnitude of in-prison misbehavior
over the time of an inmate’s incarceration. Second, we
looked at the number of 115s or 128s a prisoner received in
the year prior to his or her hearing. Since this second var-
iable includes 128s, it encompasses more behaviors than
the first variable. But unlike the first variable, it addresses
the recency of the misbehavior.
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Of these two variables, only the number of 115s
a prisoner had ever received appears to influence
releasing decisions. The more 115s an inmate had col-
lected during this period of incarceration, the lower his
or her odds of obtaining a grant; an increase of ten 115s
divided an inmate’s odds in half. This effect was only
marginally significant, and may suggest that commis-
sioners are willing to overlook recent misdeeds but are
less willing to overlook a longer history of more signif-
icant disciplinary infractions.
Figure 3
Logistic Regression Comparing Inmates being denied Parole and Inmates being granted Parole
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C. Psychological Evaluations
Inmates in our sample had been subject to multiple types of
psychiatric tests throughout their time of imprisonment
aimed to assess inmates’ risk of reoffending and/or overall
psychological well-being. Any given inmate had taken
between one and four different tests: Historical, Clinical,
and Risk Management Scales (HCR-20), Clinician Generic
Risk assessment, Axis-V Global Assessment of Functioning
(GAF), and/or the Hare Psychopathy Checklist–Revised
(PCLR-Hare). These psychiatric tests are administered
within months of the inmate’s initial hearing and subse-
quent hearings. None of these tests alone had been
administered to enough inmates in our sample for us to
assess its effects independently. To get at the question of
whether psychological assessments are important to release
decisions in a broader sense, we created a dichotomous
variable to indicate whether or not each an inmate had
received only ‘‘low-risk’’ scores (regardless of how many
tests he or she had taken). The advantage of this approach is
clarity. The disadvantage is that it necessarily eliminates
finer distinctions—for example, an inmate who received
one medium-risk assessment is classified identically to an
inmate who received four high-risk assessments.
Our results indicate that having across-the-board low-
risk scores is highly significant to suitability decisions. An
inmate who receives only scores of ‘‘low’’ is more than twice
as likely to receive a grant, compared to an inmate who
receives at least one score that is not ‘‘low.’’ This result
suggests that, consistent with the statutory criteria, the
Board takes psychological evaluations into serious consid-
eration in making their releasing decisions, and finds psy-
chiatric reports compelling when assessing an inmate’s
dangerousness to society.
D. Life Crime Characteristics
Particularly following the Lawrence and Shaputis decisions
mentioned above, it was important to include characteris-
tics of the commitment offense in our analysis. Although
commissioners are not prohibited from considering the life
crime itself, its relevance is its relationship to an inmate’s
current dangerousness. We looked at a number of charac-
teristics related to the commission of the life crime: the
charge (first degree murder, second degree murder, or
‘‘other’’), whether the crime had more than one victim,
whether the victim was defiled or mutilated, and whether
the life crime included sexual violence.
To our surprise, none of these variables was significantly
correlated with release, suggesting that they exert no inde-
pendent effect on releasing authorities’ decisions after
controlling for other factors. Insofar as we can determine
statistically, it appears that the commissioners’ decisions
are not based on the heinousness of the life crime.
The only remaining factor we tested that related to the
life crime was not related to its commission; instead, it was
a dichotomous variable indicating evasiveness or untruth-
fulness: whether the inmate lied or tried to evade capture
while he or she was under investigation. ‘‘Evasion’’
included actively running from the police, denying
involvement in the crime for which he or she was later
convicted, or lying to the police about the crime itself. We
included this variable as a rough proxy for ‘‘truthfulness’’ or
‘‘deceptiveness’’ related to the life crime. This variable’s
effect was small, but highly significant. Inmates who had
lied or evaded police were slightly, but consistently, less
likely to obtain a parole grant than inmates who had not.
The meaning of this result is not entirely clear. It is
possible that commissioners were reluctant to release
someone who had lied to police or evaded capture, but it
seems surprising that this factor is a more reliable predictor
of release than, say, whether someone was sexually violent
or murdered multiple people. Instead, we suspect that this
variable may be acting as a proxy for truthfulness or
deceptiveness more generally. For example, perhaps
inmates who lied to the police are also more likely to be
untruthful to their work supervisors, prison guards, or even
the Board, in ways that were not otherwise capturable from
the data set. The significance of this variable points to
possibilities for future research, including ethnographic or
other qualitative explorations.
E. Past Criminal Behavior
An inmate’s history of violence, as measured by the pres-
ence of prior adult violent convictions (in addition to the life
crime), appears to influence release decisions, although the
effect is only marginally significant. To our surprise, how-
ever, the effect is in the opposite direction than one might
expect: having violent convictions on an inmate’s record
prior to his conviction for the life crime actually appears to
make him or her more likely to obtain a parole grant.
Assuming that this finding is not merely statistical noise
(which it may well be, particularly given that its significance
is only marginal), we suspect that past criminal behavior is
actually serving as a proxy for an unobserved variable, such
as a familiarity with prison life, which might allow an
inmate to stay out of trouble more easily, work more
effectively with his or her attorney, or hold other advantages
in navigating prison bureaucracies. The ‘‘shock effect’’ of
being imprisoned—not only to one’s own psyche, but also
to relationships with family or friends—might also be
diminished for inmates with prior violent offenses.
F. Exit Plans
Previous research suggests that detailed release plans are
key to former inmates’ rehabilitation and to preventing
recidivism, in addition to being among the statutory factors
commissioners are directed to consider in making their
decisions. We included one such variable, which we
believed was a particularly strong indicator of an inmate’s
ability to come up with a detailed formal release plan:
whether he or she had a letter from a prospective employer
indicating a willingness to hire the inmate upon his or her
release. We found that receipt of a letter from an
employer was highly significant, indicating that the BPH
is 3.5 times more likely to release an inmate who has
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proof of strong employment prospects after being
released from prison.
G. Hearing Conduct
The remainder of the variables in our model dealt with the
conduct of the parole hearing itself. We divided this into
three categories: (1) characteristics of the hearing (the
hearing’s start time and whether it was the inmate’s first);
(2) inmate testimony (whether the inmate expressed
remorse or took responsibility for the crime, and whether
he or she successfully answered a question about the 12
steps if asked—this is a common question at the hearings,
particularly given the prevalence of substance abuse pro-
gramming); (3) other people present at the hearing (spe-
cifically, the presence of victim(s) as defined by Marsy’s Law
and the presence and recommendation of the District
Attorney). We address each category in turn below.
1. Characteristics of the Hearing. We were interested in
the hearings’ start time for two reasons. First, an Israeli
study suggested that hearings that begin early in the day
may be more likely to result in release than hearings that
start later in the day,40 and we were interested to see if
this result would be duplicated in our data. Second, an
interview study with parole commissioners suggests that
some of commissioners themselves believe that they are
less effective or attentive when hearings start later in the
day.41 Although our analyses cannot speak to commis-
sioners’ attentiveness, we found no significant difference
in the odds of receiving a grant for hearings with morn-
ing start times versus late afternoon or early afternoon
start times.
Primarily as a control, to allow us to more effectively
examine the effects of other variables of interest, we
included a variable indicating whether a hearing was an
inmate’s first hearing or a subsequent hearing. As prior
studies have found, release rates in California are lower for
initial hearings than for subsequent hearings.42 We found
that this variable was just shy of marginal significance on its
own, suggesting that the lower grant rates for initial hear-
ings are likely not due to commissioners’ refusal to grant an
inmate parole at a first hearing on principle.
2. Inmate Responses to Questions. There are many
ways to examine an inmate’s performance at a parole
hearing, and we included several in this model. First, our
data contained, two variables intended to measure an
inmate’s acceptance of his role in the commitment
offense: whether he or she expressed remorse for the
crime, or whether he or she took responsibility for the
crime. Since these two variables are closely related, and
since the coding of a particular statement as ‘‘remorseful’’
versus ‘‘taking responsibility’’ is somewhat subjective, we
collapsed them into a single measure that indicated
whether an inmate expressed remorse or took responsi-
bility for his actions at the hearing. Inmates who did one of
these two things, or both of these things, were put in one
category, while inmates who did neither of these things
were put in a second category.
We found that an inmate’s expression of remorse or
responsibility did not have a significant effect on his or her
chances of obtaining a grant. There are multiple ways we
might interpret this finding. For one, we might conclude
that in making their determinations, commissioners give
little weight to an inmate’s remorse or sense of responsi-
bility for his or her crime. It is also possible, however, that
an inmate’s overt expression of remorse or responsibility is
not the only way that commissioners assess whether an
inmate actually accepts his role in the commitment offense.
An inmate’s demeanor, tone of voice, or other actions may
all play a role in whether a commissioner believes an
inmate’s expressions of remorse or responsibility, and none
of those factors are reflected in this data.
As mentioned above, it also is fairly common for com-
missioners to ask inmates during hearings about their
participation in 12-step programs. According to the com-
missioners, the purpose of doing so is to see whether an
inmate internalized the lessons of the program or whether
his or her participation was merely pro forma.43 Our vari-
able indicates whether an inmate was asked—and
answered—anything at all about the 12 steps. For example,
an inmate might be asked, ‘‘What is step 7?’’ or ‘‘Name the
step you found most meaningful.’’ We found that failing to
answer such a question was significantly prejudicial to an
inmate’s chances of obtaining a parole grant—dividing
those chances by five—in a way that was not mirrored by
the success of doing so. That is, if an inmate has partici-
pated in a 12-step program, knowing the steps will not
necessarily help him or her obtain parole, but not knowing
the steps will significantly decrease his or her odds of
obtaining parole.
3. Third Parties Present at Parole Hearings. Victims, or
victims’ next of kin, attend only about 10 percent of parole
hearings.44 Previous research, including research con-
ducted using a subset of the data we use here, has found
a correlation between victims’ attendance and an inmate’s
chance of obtaining parole.45 However, we found no sig-
nificant effect of victim attendance on a hearing’s outcome.
This lack of significance is probably due at least in part to
the inclusion of a variable in our model to indicate whether
a hearing is an initial or subsequent hearing, since victims
are more likely to attend initial hearings, and in general
initial hearings result in fewer grants.
District Attorneys attend a majority of hearings, some-
times in person and sometimes via video or telephone
conferencing. Since DAs typically oppose release, we
expected that their support for release would be significant,
in part because it is so rare. However, we found that DA
support for release did not have a significant positive effect
compared to the DA not attending the hearing at all. In
contrast, the DA’s opposition to release had a significant
negative effect on an inmate’s chance of obtaining a parole
grant. One way to interpret these results is that since
a representative from the DA’s office attends most parole
hearings and usually opposes parole, commissioners
interpret a DA’s lack of attendance as tacit support for an
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inmate’s release; thus, there is no significant difference
between a DA supporting a grant of parole and a DA not
attending the hearing at all. Alternatively, it may simply be
the case that since the Board is specifically assessing an
inmate’s dangerousness, it is more attuned to DA opposi-
tion than to DA support.
H. Summary
This model offers a picture of cautious parole hearings in
which a near-pristine inmate profile is expected for an
inmate to be found suitable for parole release, as is
reflected in low overall grant rate for hearings in our data
set. Although ‘‘doing everything right’’ doesn’t necessarily
guarantee a finding of suitability for release, doing certain
things wrong or having ‘‘red flags’’ in one’s profile sig-
nificantly reduces the chance that an inmate will obtain
a grant.
It is striking, too, that the results largely track the official
suitability guidelines, suggesting that when it comes to
giving a parole grant versus not giving a parole grant,
commissioners are not persuaded by many factors external
to these criteria. One exception to this is opposition from
the District Attorney. But on the whole, statutory factors
such as age, in-prison behavior, a letter from a future
employer, and psychological evaluations are significant in
an inmate’s odds of getting a grant, while factors such as
a victim’s attendance at the parole hearing or the heinous-
ness of the life crime are not.
VII. Conclusion and Future Directions for Policy and
Research
Given the large number of inmates serving life sentences
with the possibility of parole, and the enormous power
vested in parole boards across the country to determine
their release, it is crucial to understand which factors are
reliably associated with parole release. Like other decision-
makers in the criminal justice system, the 340 individuals
that comprise parole boards in the United States46 exercise
tremendous discretion. Yet, the subjective nature of these
decisions has scarcely been examined. Our research sheds
some light on the factors associated with findings of suit-
ability for lifer inmates in California, but more research is
needed both within the state and on a national scale.
Guidelines and procedures vary from state to state, and
legal frameworks and political orientations change over
time.
Within California itself, the grant rate has doubled since
the period covered by our data. Future work should exam-
ine whether the factors we identify have remained consis-
tent as the grant rate has risen, and should also probe more
deeply into factors we do not cover, such as whether the
type of legal representation matters, and whether guber-
natorial review decisions hinges on the same factors.
Additionally, the effects of newer administrative mechan-
isms, such as consultations47 and petitions to advance
hearings, need to be examined.
It is also important to acknowledge that this study
reports only the first level of our regression analyses, look-
ing only at whether or not inmates are found suitable. We
have not yet examined the circumstances under which
different denial lengths are doled out, which is particularly
important given the expansion of denial lengths under
Marsy’s Law. We intend to take up these questions in
a future article, asking whether the same factors that predict
suitability decisions also predict the length of the parole
denials given.
California Governor Jerry Brown recently introduced an
initiative, intended to appear on the November 2016 ballot,
that will have the effect of converting some determinate
sentences to indeterminate ones.48 As the state shifts back
toward an indeterminate sentencing scheme, a rich
understanding of decision making by the BPH will take on
even greater importance.
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